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The Internal Capital Markets of
Global Dealer Banks
Arun Gupta1
Abstract
This study uncovers the existence of a trillion-dollar internal capital market that played a
central role in the financing of dealer banks during the 2007–09 Global Financial Crisis.
Hand-collecting a novel set of dealer microdata at the subsidiary level, I present a unique set
of facts on the evolution of inter-affiliate loans between US primary dealers and their
(primarily foreign) siblings. First, the aggregate size of these dealer internal capital markets
quadrupled from $335 billion in 2001 to $1.2 trillion by 2007. Second, 25 percent of total
repurchase agreements and 62 percent of total securities lending reported on US primary
dealer balance sheets were sourced internally from sibling dealers by year-end 2007. Third,
internal securities lending collapsed by 55 percent during the 2007–09 crisis. These facts
suggest that incorporating internal capital market dynamics may be fruitful for future
research on dealer behavior and market liquidity.
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Introduction

The 2007-09 financial crisis highlighted the central role that dealer banks play in issues
concerning market liquidity, global financial stability, and the real economy. Compared to
the volume of empirical studies covering traditional commercial banks and nonfinancial
firms, the academic literature is relatively young in its exploration of dealer bank behavior.
To this end, it is important to establish a set of key observables and empirical patterns that
characterize dealer balance sheets. Utilizing a novel set of hand-collected data, this paper
reveals that a surprisingly large share of dealer liabilities is funded through the internal
capital markets. This comprises all forms of financing (for example, repo, securities lending)
that take place between the United States and foreign subsidiaries of global dealer
organizations. To the best of my knowledge, there has been no prior literature on this topic.2
In particular, the largest single counterparty of a US primary dealer is its (typically foreign)
dealer sibling—not an external party, as is assumed a priori. By year-end 2007, US primary
dealers, on average, financed 35 percent of their balance sheet using internal loans from
sibling dealers. The majority of these internal loans took the form of securities lending and
repurchase agreements, implying the cross-border transfer of collateral inside each dealer
organization. These activities aggregate to a $1.2 trillion internal capital market (as of fourth
quarter 2007) that was previously invisible to the academic literature because of netting in
the consolidated 10-Q and 10-K reports filed by broker-dealers. I uncover these facts using
disaggregated subsidiary-level balance sheets, presenting a fuller picture of the modern-day
liquidity management practices of global dealer banks. Given the importance of US primary
dealers to various facets of the US financial system (for example, open market operations as
well as market making of corporate bonds, money market instruments, and derivatives),
these facts suggest that studying the incentives, trade-offs, and constraints driving internal
capital market allocations within dealer organizations would be particularly fruitful for
future research.
This paper contributes to two threads of literature. First, these facts add to a growing
literature on dealer behavior. While there have been, over the past several decades,
significant theoretical contributions (Amihud and Mendelson 1980; Brunnermeier and
Pedersen 2009; Dang, Gorton, and Holmstrom 2020; Gorton and Ordoñez 2014; Ho and Stoll
1983; Infante 2020; Stoll 1978), historical limitations on the availability of public data have
restricted the ability to build empirical tests. In the past decade, however, several papers
have made large empirical strides by employing proprietary data sources. For example,
Gorton and Metrick (2012) utilized proprietary industry data to reveal that, while fragilities
in the housing market may have been a trigger, it was widespread runs on repurchase
agreements at the largest dealer banks that transformed a housing crash into a global

Primary dealers are US broker-dealer subsidiaries (owned by either domestic or foreign parents) that act as
market makers of US government securities in the context of open market operations.
2
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systemic crisis.3 Goldberg (2020) utilizes confidential regulatory data to establish the
connection between dealer banks and the real economy, showing that declines in dealer
liquidity supply predict reduced debt issuance and investment by nonfinancial firms, in
addition to reduced aggregate economic activity. Using similar confidential regulatory data,
Carlson and Macchiavelli (2020) show that the 2008 emergency lending facilities alleviated
dealers’ funding pressures, helping avoid potential fire sales in addition to providing better
liquidity to the bond markets. As a complement to this growing literature, I present several
new stylized facts about dealer banks that are fundamental to their funding model. In
particular, the hand-collected data presented in this paper reveal the surprising importance
that internal capital markets hold for dealer banks. Given that roughly 25 percent of all
repurchase agreements and 62 percent of all securities loans on US primary dealer balance
sheets are funded internally through sibling institutions, theories of dealer financing and
liquidity would greatly benefit from an exploration of the dynamics driving dealer internal
capital markets.
Second, this paper contributes more generally to the literature on the internal capital
markets of financial intermediaries and, in particular, highlights the need to differentiate the
literature into two distinct categories: the internal capital markets of branches versus the
internal capital markets of subsidiaries. Evidence on the existence of internal capital markets
in deposit-taking commercial banks has been well documented, for example, Campello
(2002), Cetorelli and Goldberg (2012a and 2012b), and Gilje, Loutskina, and Strahan (2016).
These studies document the dynamics of internal flows between branches within the same
commercial bank.4 In this way, the commercial bank reallocates excess deposits between
domestic and foreign branches based on local funding needs. These internal capital markets
tend to be frictionless, as evidenced by several distinct features:
•

Unlike subsidiaries, branches are, by definition, not financed through equity and thus
are legally the same entity as the commercial bank parent. Branches cannot fail
independently from the parent.

•

Internal loans between branches of the same commercial bank are subject to minimal
regulatory interference.

In contrast, dealer internal capital markets comprise loans between subsidiaries (in other
words, legally distinct entities). The internal capital markets of subsidiaries differ
significantly from the internal capital markets of branches within the same commercial bank
subsidiary in several ways:
•

Unlike branches, subsidiaries of an organization each have their own subsidiary-level
equity capital and are legally separate entities. As described in Bliss (2003), as well
as Bliss and Kaufman (2006), each subsidiary can fail independently from the rest of

Copeland, Martin, and Walker (2014), Krishnamurthy, Nagel, and Orlov (2014), and Martin, Skeie, and von
Thadden (2014) provide additional empirical evidence that financial institutions can face risk from their
secured wholesale funding lenders.
4 Rather than internal lending, Houston, James, and Marcus (1997) study the capital ratios of subsidiaries
versus the consolidated organization.
3
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the organization and can be subject to separate insolvency regimes.5
•

The majority of dealer internal loans are collateralized.

•

Subsidiaries located in different countries can be subject to varying degrees of
regulatory costs based on local jurisdiction, such as regulatory capital charges and
ring-fencing measures (Goldberg and Gupta 2013).

The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section II covers the data source and
description. Section III provides an overview of the institutional details surrounding the
different types of holding company structures. Section IV presents new stylized facts on the
inter-affiliate exposures between a US primary dealer subsidiary and its (primarily foreign)
siblings from 2001 to 2014. Section V concludes.

II.

Data

Data on US primary dealer (subsidiary only) balance sheets are hand-collected from public
annual audited report Form X-17A-5 PDFs, which all registered US broker-dealers file
annually with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and which are publicly
searchable on the SEC EDGAR database.6 Individual dealer filings can be found by entering
central index key (CIK) identifiers provided on the SEC web page titled “Company
Information about Active Broker-Dealers.”7 Note that this should not be confused with an
entirely different confidential data set that has the same name (X-17A-5 report) and that
features a completely different set of reporting fields. It is also different from the well-known
10-Q and 10-K filings, which represent (netted) financial information for the consolidated
organization (as opposed to subsidiary level).
I define “affiliates,” “related parties,” or “sibling institutions” as subsidiaries that are wholly
owned by the same parent holding company. Financial securities in the internal capital
market consist of any form of lending extended between siblings within the same
organization. Examples include repurchase agreements, securities loans, short-term
uncollateralized loans, long-term subordinated debt, and brokerage receivables/payables.
The public Form X-17A-5 reports publish information on each US broker-dealer subsidiary’s
outstanding loan and borrowing exposures vis-à-vis affiliates as of the end of each year. In
this study, I focus on the 10 largest primary dealers, which have significant international
operations. Primary dealers are US broker-dealer subsidiaries (possibly owned by domestic
or foreign parents) that act as market makers of US government securities during the open
market operation process. Although these reported sibling exposure figures could
technically be vis-à-vis any sibling (US or foreign), they are most likely with respect to
foreign siblings, since the balance sheets of US non-primary dealer siblings are not big
enough to account for the large internal exposures reported on US primary dealer filings.
5

Though post-2008 regulations have made the independent failure of subsidiaries less clear.

6 https://www.sec.gov/edgar/searchedgar/companysearch.html.
7

https://www.sec.gov/help/foiadocsbdfoiahtm.html.
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While it is not possible to know which foreign siblings are the internal counterparties,
London tends to house a large presence of dealer operations for the major global dealer
banks. (Other locations could span financial hubs such as Hong Kong, Frankfurt, Singapore,
and Zurich.)
Please note that all numbers presented in Section IV are stock variables, not flows. This
means, for example, that dealer internal capital markets consisted of $1.2 trillion of internal
debt outstanding (US primary dealers’ liabilities that face sibling counterparties) as of
December 31, 2007. Also, because of its 2008 bankruptcy, Lehman Brothers has been
excluded from the sample to ensure that all figures in Section IV represent balance sheet
adjustments, as opposed to filers dropping out of the sample. Aside from this, the panel is
mostly balanced except for Credit Suisse, which did not file in 2001, and JPMorgan Chase &
Co., which did not file in 2002, 2004, 2005, or 2006.

III.

Holding Company Level

In this section, I provide an overview of the internal capital markets of a typical global
financial institution, in addition to outlining the variety of regulatory restrictions imposed
on internal lending flows. These US primary dealer subsidiaries can be housed inside
organizations with differing corporate structures:
(1) Bank Holding Companies (BHCs): Citigroup, JPMorgan Chase, Bank of America.
(2) US global BHCs are typically composed of (at least) a parent holding company, a US
commercial bank subsidiary insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(FDIC), a US broker-dealer subsidiary, and a foreign broker-dealer subsidiary.
Section 23A of the Federal Reserve Act (details are provided at the end of Section III)
imposes strict limitations on the ability of commercial banks to provide internal
loans to their nonbank siblings and their parent holding company. The purpose
behind this is to restrict a leak of the federal subsidy into non-depository
institutions.8
(3) Investment Banks (IBs): Goldman Sachs, Merrill Lynch, Bear Stearns, Morgan
Stanley.
(4) US global IBs are typically composed of (at least) a parent holding company, a US
broker-dealer subsidiary, and a foreign broker-dealer subsidiary. In the pre-crisis
period, there were minimal regulatory restrictions on internal funding flows
between dealer siblings. Although Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley became bank
holding companies post-crisis, I categorize them as IBs because their business model
is still predominantly that of an investment bank.

8

https://www.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed/section23a.htm.
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(5) Foreign Banking Organizations (FBOs): Barclays, BNP Paribas, Credit Suisse.
(6) FBOs have historically followed the universal banking model, where no regulatory
ring fence existed between insured commercial bank deposits and broker-dealer
siblings. This has begun to change post-crisis (Goldberg and Gupta 2013).
Each organization typically has thousands of subsidiaries in its hierarchy, and the vast
majority are special-purpose vehicles and other shell corporations. In this study, I will focus
on the main operating subsidiaries, which I have outlined in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Stylized Diagram of the Bank Internal Capital Markets
This diagram provides a stylized illustration of the various segments of the internal capital market within a
banking organization.

Source: Author’s illustration.

Ultimately, all internal capital market funds derive from external funds entering at different
points in the organization. These entry points are as follows:
(1) Publicly traded stock at the parent holding company
(2) Commercial paper and long-term unsecured debt issued at the parent holding
company
(3) Collateralized and other wholesale funding at the US and foreign broker-dealer
subsidiaries
(4) FDIC-insured domestic deposits or uninsured foreign deposits at the commercial
bank subsidiary
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Mirroring the aforementioned external funding categories, internal funds (comprising the
internal capital markets of BHCs) can be categorized into four types, as shown in Figure 2.
Figure 2: Four Segments of the Bank Internal Capital Markets
This table summarizes the four major segments of the internal capital market within a banking organization.
Type

Internal Loan Type

Secured?

(1)

Internal capital allocation

No

Sourced from Which External
Funding?
Equity shares issued to market

(2)

Parent hold co. loans to subs

No

Parent comm. paper and corp. bonds

(3)

Internal repo and sec lending
between dealer siblings

Yes

External repo and sec lending at each
dealer sibling

(4)

Inter-branch loans

No

Commercial bank deposits

Notes

Driven by clients
Section 23A of FR
Act places a ring
fence between
bank deposits and
nonbank siblings

Sources: Federal Reserve FR Y9-LP; FFIEC 031/041 forms; author’s table.

In reference to segments (1) and (2) in Figure 1 and Figure 2, parent holding companies do
not typically perform any external business on their own, but raise a variety of non-deposit
unsecured funding (commercial paper, long-term corporate bonds, and equity) from
wholesale markets and downstream them to subsidiaries.9 Parent holding companies
present a single face to the debt and equity markets, allowing market stakeholders to have a
claim on the full organization (deriving income from all subsidiaries). While the parent
holding company may appear to be a trivial shell corporation at first glance, studying its
behavior is key to understanding segments (1) and (2) of the internal capital market. That is
because the CFO resides at the parent holding company and can implement policy affecting
operations in all subsidiaries downstream. (However, the degree of centralized versus
decentralized control can vary across institutions.)
Regarding segment (3), the gross amount of internal repo and securities lending among US
primary dealers and their siblings expanded tremendously pre-crisis. While the reasoning is
difficult to identify, existing narratives suggest that, prior to the 2007–08 crisis, US primary
dealers were known to take collateral posted by their US clients and finance it wherever it
was globally cheapest. Because of the lax leverage limits and cheap funding available in
locations like the UK (Aitken and Singh, 2010), US clients gave permission for their collateral
to be internally rehypothecated anywhere, which likely contributed to the pre-crisis rise in
internal repo and securities lending.
Lastly, with respect to segment (4), the use of commercial bank deposits to finance any
nonbank siblings is strictly limited by Section 23A of the Federal Reserve Act, which imposes
a strict one-way ring fence. Enacted in 1933 in the aftermath of the Great Depression, Section
23A of the Federal Reserve Act was implemented by regulators to prevent the transfer of the
federal subsidy to non-depository financial institutions. This law imposes quantitative
9

Section 23B of the Federal Reserve Act requires that internal rates for BHCs follow arm’s-length pricing.
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limitations and collateral requirements on commercial bank extensions of credit to nonbank
subsidiaries, with certain exemptions. Specifically, it states the following:

IV.

•

The aggregate amount of internal loans to any one nonbank sibling of the member
bank should not exceed 10 percent of the Tier 1 and 2 capital of the member bank.

•

The aggregate amount of internal loans to all nonbank siblings of the member bank
should not exceed 20 percent of the Tier 1 and 2 capital of the member bank.

US Primary Dealer Subsidiary Level

This section presents novel facts on the dynamics of dealer internal capital markets from the
perspective of US primary dealer subsidiaries (all based in New York). Included in the sample
are 10 large US primary dealer subsidiaries, listed in Figure 3.
Figure 3: US Primary Dealer Subsidiaries
This table presents the identities of the US primary dealer subsidiaries that constitute the reporting sample.
Owned by an Investment Bank

Owned by a US Bank Holding Co.

Owned by a Foreign Banking Org.

Bear Stearns & Co. Inc.

J.P. Morgan Securities LLC

BNP Paribas Securities Corp.

Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith

Banc of America Securities LLC

Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC

Goldman Sachs. & Co.

Citigroup Global Markets Inc.

Barclays Capital Inc.

Morgan Stanley & Co. LLC

Sources: SEC Form X-17A-5 for each institution examined.

Fact 1: Internal liabilities of US primary dealers nearly quadrupled over the pre-crisis
period, to $1.2 trillion in the fourth quarter of 2007. On average, dealer
subsidiaries financed 35 percent of their balance sheet vis-à-vis sibling
counterparties.10
A new contribution to the literature is that internal liabilities made up a surprisingly large
share of the US primary dealer subsidiary’s funding model. Looking at more traditional
sources of dealer data, such as 10-Q and 10-K reports filed with the SEC, hides this surprising
statistic (because of the netting of internal exposures in the consolidated balance sheet).
Figure 4 illustrates a simplified view of the US primary dealer subsidiary balance sheet,
where all assets and liabilities can be categorized as “internal” or “external,” depending on
whether or not the counterparty is a sibling institution. These internal assets and liabilities
in red constitute financial instruments in the internal capital market for global dealer bank
organizations. Figure 5 takes the liability side (right side) of the balance sheet and aggregates
the internal and external liabilities outstanding across the 10 US primary dealers in the
sample. I find that, previously unknown to the literature, internal liabilities make up a
10

Sources: SEC Form X-17A-5 for each institution examined.
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surprisingly large share of the US primary dealer funding model. Figure 6 shows that US
primary dealers’ reliance on inter-affiliate funds for financing gradually increased from 26
percent in 2001 to 37 percent by 2014, suggesting that the importance of internal capital
markets to the funding of dealer banks is not just a pre-crisis phenomenon. Last, Figure 7
shows a consistent pattern across all organization types that US primary dealers typically
maintained a net borrowing relationship vis-à-vis their affiliates.
Figure 4: Simplified Balance Sheet View, US Primary Dealer Subsidiaries

Source: Author’s illustration.
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Figure 5: Funding Model, US Primary Dealer Subsidiaries
This figure presents the dollar amount of liabilities that face external counterparties versus internal
counterparties, aggregated across US primary dealer subsidiaries.

Internal vs. External Liabilities
US Primary Dealers (subsidiary only), Aggregate

2.5

Lehman Bankruptcy
2
External

Trillions 1.5
USD
Internal

1
.5

0
2000

2002

2004

2006
2008
Year-End

Includes only Credit Suisse, Barclays, BNP, JPM, Citi, BofA, Goldman,
Morgan Stanley, Bear, Merrill

Sources: SEC Form X-17A-5 for each institution examined.
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Figure 6: Internal Liability Share, US Primary Dealer Subsidiaries
This figure presents inter-affiliate liabilities as a share of total liabilities, aggregated across US primary dealer
subsidiaries.

Share of Liabilities Sourced from Affiliates
Median, US Primary Dealers

2000

2002

2004

2006
2008
Year-End

2010

2012

2014

Annual Frequency
Includes Credit Suisse, Barclays, BNP, JPM, Citi, BofA, Goldman, Morgan Stanley, Bear, Merrill

Sources: SEC Form X-17A-5 for each institution examined.

Figure 7: Internal Assets (Liabilities) as a Share of Total Assets (Liabilities)
This table presents the average share of internal assets (liabilities) for US primary dealer subsidiaries as of
the fourth quarter of 2007.

Type

Internal Asset Share

Internal Liability Share

IB

16%

32%

US BHCs

23%

34%

FBOs

24%

39%

Average

20%

35%

Sources: SEC Form X-17A-5 for each institution examined.

As Gorton and Metrick (2012) discuss, evidence that a run on external repurchase
agreements occurred during the 2007–09 Global Financial Crisis, Figure 5 (and later, Figure
9) show that internal liabilities collapsed in a very similar stride. The collapse in external
liabilities (blue line, Figure 5) is explained by rising uncertainty about the true value of
mortgage-backed securities underlying these external repurchase agreements. But a
separate narrative may be needed to explain the complementary collapse in internal
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liabilities. In particular, it is not clear why siblings’ counterparties would reduce exposures
to one another, since both are wholly owned by the same ultimate parent and set of
shareholders. A few possible narratives (though not exhaustive) are introduced in the text
after Fact 3.
Fact 2: Nearly 66 percent of internal capital market instruments came in the form of
repo and securities lending.11
In Figure 8, I provide a more elaborate view of the subsidiary-level balance sheets within a
global dealer bank. Internal liabilities can be broken down into internal repo and securities
lending, internal brokerage payables, internal short-term unsecured debt, and internal longterm unsubordinated debt. Figure 9 aggregates each internal liability subcategory across the
sample and finds that the majority of these internal liabilities took the form of internal repo
and securities lending instruments. The remaining categories, such as long- and short-term
unsecured internal loans between siblings as well as internal brokerage payables, were
unaffected during the crisis.12
Figure 8: Internal Repo and Securities Lending, Detailed Balance Sheet View

Source: Author’s illustration.

Sources: SEC Form X-17A-5 for each institution examined.
Internal brokerage accounts refer to the case when a dealer owns its own proprietary hedge fund or asset
management operation.
11
12
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Figure 9: Composition of Internal Liabilities, US Primary Dealer Subsidiaries
This graph provides a time series of the dollar amounts for each type of internal liability from Figure 8,
aggregated across US primary dealer subsidiaries.

Internal Liability Composition
US Primary Dealers (subsidiary only), Aggregate
Lhman Bankruptcy

Internal Repo & Securities Lending

Internal Brokerage Payables
Internal ST Unsecured Debt

Internal LT Unsubordinated Debt

2000

2002

2004

2006
2008
Year-End

2010

2012

2014

Annual Frequency
Includes only Credit Suisse, Barclays, BNP, JPM, Citi, BofA, Goldman,
Morgan Stanley, Bear, Merrill

Sources: SEC Form X-17A-5 for each institution examined.

Fact 2 shows that dealer subsidiaries reduced internal exposures to one another during the
crisis. Cetorelli and Goldberg (2012b) find the opposite effect in the context of commercial
bank branches (represented in the bottom-left box in Figure 1), where foreign branches
sacrificed local loan opportunities to provide emergency (internal) loans to US branches
during the crisis. This difference is likely because the majority of internal dealer financing
decisions are derived from activities driven by clients/creditors.
Fact 3: During the crisis, 25 percent of primary dealers’ total repo and 62 percent of their
total securities lending activities occurred with siblings (Figure 10). This makes
siblings their largest counterparty exposure. Inter-affiliate securities lending
collapsed by 55 percent during the 2007–09 crisis.13
Consistent with this, the Lehman Brothers examiner report (United States Bankruptcy Court
2010) confirms that, prior to entering bankruptcy, Lehman’s US dealer subsidiary obtained
as much as 63 percent of its repo and securities lending from siblings. Facts 2 and 3 establish
that internally sourced repo and securities lending was an industrywide practice. Several
13

Sources: SEC Form X-17A-5 for each institution examined.
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interesting trends emerge. First, securities lending vis-à-vis affiliates outpaced those vis-àvis external counterparties pre-crisis (Figure 11), though it was vice versa for repurchase
agreements (Figure 12). Second, these inter-affiliate securities loans collapsed by 55 percent
in 2008, while inter-affiliate repo remained relatively stable. One difference between these
two types of collateralized lending is that repurchase agreements tend to involve (safer)
fixed-income securities, while securities lending typically involves equities in addition to
fixed income. Without more granular information on the type of collateral underlying this
inter-affiliate lending, the conclusions one can make from this are conjectural at best.
However, given its association with riskier asset classes, one possibility is that inter-affiliate
securities lending may have been driven by the cross-border demand for speculative trading
activities, as opposed to a demand for safe assets.
Figure 10: Internal Repo (Sec. Lending) as a Share of Total Repo (Sec. Lending)
This table presents the average share of inter-affiliate repo (securities lending) for US primary dealer
subsidiaries as of the fourth quarter of 2007.

Type

Internal Repo Share

Internal Securities Lending Share

IB

23%

73%

US BHCs

23%

46%

FBOs

31%

63%

Average

25%

62%

Sources: SEC Form X-17A-5 for each institution examined.
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Figure 11: Internal versus External Securities Lending
This figure presents the dollar amount of inter-affiliate versus external securities lending, aggregated across
US primary dealer subsidiaries.

Internal vs. External Securities Lending
US Primary Dealers (subsidiary only), Aggregate
Lehman Bankruptcy

Internal

External

2000

2002

2004

2006
2008
Year-End

2010

Annual Frequency
Includes only Credit Suisse, Barclays, BNP, JPM, Citi, BofA, Goldman,
Morgan Stanley, Bear, Merrill

Sources: SEC Form X-17A-5 for each institution examined.
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Figure 12: Internal versus External Repo
This figure presents the dollar amount of inter-affiliate versus external repo, aggregated across US primary
dealer subsidiaries.

Internal vs. External Repurchase Agreements
US Primary Dealers (subsidiary only), Aggregate
Lehman Bankruptcy

External

Internal

2000

2002

2004

2006
2008
Year-End

2010

2012

2014

Annual Frequency
Includes only Credit Suisse, Barclays, BNP, JPM, Citi, BofA, Goldman,
Morgan Stanley, Bear, Merrill

Sources: SEC Form X-17A-5 for each institution examined.

An alternative narrative that may relate to these facts is documented by Aitken and Singh
(2010). Although Aitken and Singh (2010) do not explicitly attribute this to inter-affiliate
versus external issues, one reason behind the cross-border rehypothecation of collateral is
the difference in regulatory regimes across the United States and United Kingdom. In
particular, the United Kingdom allowed for an unlimited amount of customer assets to be
rehypothecated, whereas in the United States, broker-dealers were capped by Rule 15c3-3
when using customer securities to finance proprietary activities. However, the United States
provides a defined set of customer protection rules for rehypothecated assets, whereas the
United Kingdom does not. This difference meant that when Lehman’s UK dealer subsidiary
filed for insolvency, customers who allowed reuse of their collateral received little statutory
protection.
A general theme is that, in the pre-crisis period, dealer banks maintained global settlement
systems, for example, the collateral of US dealer clients was funded globally wherever it was
cheapest. This was implemented by internally rehypothecating US client collateral from the
United States to foreign dealer siblings. As quoted in Braithwaite (2014),
“. . . the group [Lehman] was ‘organised in functional and market areas, rather than by
legal entity’ and on a day to day basis it was ‘managed and run mainly along global
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product lines, rather than as separate entities’ . . . LBIE [Lehman’s UK dealer sub] also
played a pivotal role in proprietary trading and diverse intra-group transactions.
Moreover, ‘it was a main repository for the property of its affiliates in connection with
their activities in Europe’ . . . In the ordinary course of events, dealings between LBIE
and affiliates and clients took place, it seemed, without a great deal of attention often
being paid to the precise ownership or location of property. This all changed with the
onset of insolvency. Now, LBIE’s counterparties rushed to establish their proprietary
rights in order to extract their assets from the administration and thereby avoid the fate
facing unsecured creditors. As the Court of Appeal pointed out in the ‘Rascals’ decision,
complex arrangements whose legal effects had mattered little when the group was
solvent were now subject to interpretation on a ‘strict’ basis . . . The Lehman Brothers
group’s collapse triggered a global scramble to establish property rights, so that
counterparties could avoid the fate of unsecured creditors.”
Connecting this narrative to the figures in Fact 3, one could conjecture that US clients may
have become concerned with the financial condition of their own non-Lehman dealer after
learning about the bankruptcy of Lehman and thus wanted to internally shift their collateral
back within US borders as a preemptive measure. In this way, global rehypothecation chains
would have broken along geographical borders. While the collapse of inter-affiliate securities
lending in Figure 11 is consistent with this, it is unclear why inter-affiliate repurchase
agreements remained stable during the crisis (Figure 12). Resolving this discrepancy would
be fruitful for future research because it could reveal more about the economic mechanisms
driving inter-affiliate instruments, as well as dealer funding decisions more generally. An
interesting research question is whether this collapse in inter-affiliate securities lending
further exacerbated troubles at US primary dealers during the crisis.
Fact 4: During the crisis, US primary dealer internal claims on sibling institutions
collapsed far less than their internal liabilities.14
Figure 13 provides a disaggregated balance sheet view of an internal reverse repurchase
agreement or securities borrowing transactions between siblings. Figure 14 demonstrates
that the asset side of a US primary dealer subsidiary balance sheet has historically had higher
exposure to external counterparties as compared to the liability side. Most of the collateral
rehypothecated into US primary dealer books on the asset side comes from external
counterparties (that is, likely US-based clients), while far less collateral is internally
rehypothecated from sibling subsidiaries. Instead, as shown in Figure 15, the direction of
collateral movement pre-crisis was typically going abroad, consistent with the regulatory
arbitrage story (Aitken and Singh, 2010). Figure 15 also shows a strong reversal post-crisis,
where collateral is internally repatriated back onto US shores.

14

Sources: SEC Form X-17A-5 for each institution examined
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Figure 13: Internal Reverse Repo and Securities Borrowing, Detailed Balance Sheet
View

Source: Author’s illustration.

Figure 14: Internal versus External Assets
This figure presents the dollar amount of assets that face external counterparties versus internal
counterparties, aggregated across US primary dealer subsidiaries.

Internal vs. External Assets
US Primary Dealers (subsidiary only), Aggregate
Lehman Bankruptcy
External

Internal

2000

2002

2004

2006
2008
Year-End

2010

Annual Frequency
Includes only Credit Suisse, Barclays, BNP, JPM, Citi, BofA, Goldman,
Morgan Stanley, Bear, Merrill

Sources: SEC Form X-17A-5 for each institution examined.
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Figure 15: Net Internal Exposure
This figure presents the netted amount of internal assets (a.k.a. internal assets – internal liabilities), aggregated
across US primary dealer subsidiaries. As the majority of this is collateralized, a negative value implies that
collateral travels, on net, from the US primary dealer outward to affiliates.

Netted Internal Exposure (Net Internal Assets − Liabilities)
US Primary Dealers (subsidiary only), Aggregate
Lehman Bankruptcy

2000

2002

2004

2006
2008
Year-End

2010

2012

2014

Annual Frequency
Includes only Credit Suisse, Barclays, BNP, JPM, Citi, BofA, Goldman,
Morgan Stanley, Bear, Merrill

Sources: SEC Form X-17A-5 for each institution examined.

Fact 5: The median subsidiary-level leverage reached as high as 87 and has historically
been much higher than the leverage of the consolidated organization. This
discrepancy can be partly explained by the large size of dealer internal capital
markets from Fact 1, suggesting that the growth (and fall) in primary dealer size
were partly fueled by internal leveraging (and subsequent deleveraging).15
Because internal capital markets net out in consolidation when reported in SEC 10-Q and 10K filings, the leverage of the consolidated dealer organization masks the actual leverage of
its operating dealer subsidiaries. Given that subsidiaries could fail independently from the
rest of the firm pre-crisis, and that subsidiaries, unlike branches, are typically not liable for
the external debt of any other nonbank sibling, subsidiary-only leverage ratios do matter for
understanding the riskiness of the dealer. As illustrated in Fact 1, US primary dealer
subsidiaries raised a significant portion of their liabilities from internal sources, partly
explaining why the actual leverage of the primary dealer subsidiary (which includes internal
15

Sources: SEC Form X-17A-5 and annual reports for each institution examined.
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and external debt) has traditionally been higher than that of the entire organization (Figure
16).
Figure 16: Subsidiary-Level versus Consolidated Leverage
This figure shows the median amount of leverage on the subsidiary-level balance sheet versus that on the
consolidated organization balance sheet. Note that organization leverage is represented as risk-weighted
assets (RWA)/Tier 1 capital for BHCs and FBOs and as total assets/total equity for IBs (since IBs did not report
Tier 1 capital and RWAs pre-crisis), while subsidiary leverage is total assets/total equity (since dealers do not
report Tier 1 capital and RWAs).

Subsidiary-Level vs. Consolidated Leverage
Lehman Bankruptcy

US Primary Dealer
(subsidiary-level) Leverage

Consolidated Organization Leverage

2000

2002

2004

2006
2008
Year-End

2010

2012

2014

Annual Frequency
Includes Credit Suisse, Barclays, BNP, JPM, Citi, BofA, Goldman, Morgan Stanley, Bear, Merrill

Sources: SEC Form X-17A-5 and annual reports for each institution examined.

To illustrate how the discrepancy between subsidiary and organizational leverage ratios can
arise through simple reallocation of existing resources, take an example where two sibling
subsidiaries exist. Each subsidiary has financed itself through $1 of equity capital and $1 of
external debt and has invested the $2 (on the asset side) with external counterparties. Thus,
the leverage ratios of subsidiary A, subsidiary B, and the consolidated firm are all identically
2. Let’s say subsidiary A reallocates one of its two dollars on the asset side and internally
lends it to B. In this case, subsidiary A’s leverage ratio is still 2, and the leverage ratio of the
consolidated firm is also still 2 (as this $1 of internal lending gets netted out in
consolidation). However, the leverage ratio of subsidiary B has now grown to 3, as B’s fixed
equity of $1 is now supporting $1 of external debt and $1 of internal debt. The subtle point
here is that, since dealer subsidiaries can fail independently from the rest of the organization,
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internal debt is not really that different from external debt. Especially if subsidiaries A and B
exist in different jurisdictions, they would be subject to competing bankruptcy proceedings
and pools of creditors if the global organization were to ever fail. While an internal loan may
have been treated differently from external debt before the bankruptcy, the creditors of
subsidiary A will exercise their legal claim on B’s assets as if it were an external claim. Given
that an average of 35 percent of US primary dealer subsidiary balance sheets were internally
financed via sibling counterparties in 2007, the example just provided is by no means a trivial
phenomenon in the liquidity management practices of global dealer bank organizations.16
The results of my study have implications for the cross-border resolution of dealer banks as
well as ongoing policy debates surrounding regulatory actions that place ring fences along
business line and geographical borders. Goldberg and Gupta (2013) overview some
measures of regulatory “home bias” and financial protectionism being implemented
internationally. As stated in Gorton, Laartis, and Muir (2022), “regulatory changes to the
financial architecture in the post-crisis era have aimed to make collateral immobile, most
notably with the BIS [Bank for International Settlements] Liquidity Coverage Ratio for
banks.” Figure 15 suggests that, during the pre-crisis period, a surprisingly large volume of
collateral was intermediated across geographical borders within each dealer organization.
The economic importance of these large yet invisible global flows (as well as the unintended
consequences of regulatory restrictions on them) should be understood prior to the
implementation of new regulations. These issues pose many open questions for future
research.

V.

Conclusion

This study uncovers details on the internal capital markets of global dealer banks. This
paper’s key contribution to the literature on shadow banking is that a substantial volume of
cash and collateral is intermediated entirely inside holding companies, which nets out in
consolidated balance sheet data. Unraveling these sibling flows reveals a number of new
findings about the funding decisions, liquidity management practices, and nature of sibling
relationships inside dealer bank organizations. Many open questions arise regarding the
implications of subsidiary-level funding dynamics on dealer default risk, asset prices, and
the real economy.

16 Adrian,

Etula, and Muir (2014) use an aggregate subsidiary-level dealer leverage measure taken from FRED
Flow of Funds data to explain a significant amount of variation in asset prices. The dynamics of inter-affiliate
exposures, which drive the difference between consolidated and subsidiary-level leverage, may have significant
implications for variation in asset prices.
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